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EVIDENCE: ADMISSION OF AGENT'S DECLARATIONS
TO PROVE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
When one is injured by an agent it is necessary to prove that the
agent was acting within the course of his employment before a recov-
ery can be had against the principal. Sometimes the agent will state
at the scene of the accident that he was acting for his principal when
the accident occurred. The question then arises whether this declara-
tion, which is clearly hearsay, may be put into evidence for the purpose
of proving that the agent was acting within the course of his employ-
ment.
In Turner v. Burford Buick Corp.' there was a collision between
automobiles driven by the defendant's agent and the plaintiff. At the
scene of the accident the agent stated to a police officer and to the
driver of the plaintiff's automobile that he was employed by Burford
as a salesman and that he was on business for them at the time of the
accident. At the trial the defendant admitted that the driver was its
agent but denied that he was acting in the course of his employment
at the time of the accident. The agent's declarations were offered in
evidence by the plaintiff for the purpose of proving course of employ-
ment and were admitted over the defendant's objection. However,
the trial court later set aside the jury's verdict for the plaintiff on the
ground "that the evidence as to the declarations of [the agent] ...
should not have been admitted in evidence, and without that evidence
there was no proof of the agency ...... 2 On appeal, the trial court's rul-
ing was reversed. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the
agent's declarations were admissible, reasoning that "when... a prima
facie case of agency is made out, the agent's own declarations and ad-
missions become admissible"-3 to prove course of employment.
In essence, the Virginia rule is that extra-judicial declarations are
inadmissible to prove the fact of agency,4 but they are admissible to
1201 Va. 6g3, 112 S.E.2d 911 (1966).
'Id. at 697, 112 S.E.2d at 914. The trial judge apparently used the word agency
in its broadest sense-the fact of agency or employment plus course of employment.
This is necessarily so because the defendant admitted that the driver was its em-
ployee.
3Id. at 697, 112 S.E.2d at 914-
'201 Va. 693, 697, 112 S.E.2d 911, 914 (ig6o); Bankers Fire Ins. Co. v. Henderson,
196 Va. 195, 83 S.E.2d 424 (1954); Griffith v. Electrolux Corp., 176 Va. 378, 11 S.E.2d
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prove course of employment once a prima facie case of agency is es-
tablished.5 This approach, hereinafter referred to as the "prima facie
rule," while recognized by other jurisdictions,6 appears to be a minor-
ity holding.7 A majority of jurisdictions still adhere to the rule adopted
by the Restatement of Agency to the effect that extra-judicial declara-
tions of an agent are inadmissible in evidence to prove course of em-
ployment as well as the fact of agency.8 The question, therefore, is
why the Virginia court will admit the declarations to prove course of
employment when it will not admit them to prove the fact of agency.9
It would seem that the objections to either would be coexistent.
The reason for excluding such out of court declarations is that
they are hearsay.10 Therefore, if such declarations are admitted to
644 (1940);. Moore v. Aetna Cas. &c Sur. Co., 155 Va. 556, 155 S.E. 707 (193o); Hoge
v. Turner, 96 Va. 624, 32 S.E. 291 (i&8); Fisher v. White, 94 Va. 236, 26 S.. 537
(1897).
In Hoge v. Turner, supra, the court stated: "It is settled law that the declara-
tions or acts of an agent cannot be received to prove his agency. That fact must be
proved by other evidence, and must first be established before his declarations or
acts are admissible as evidence." 96 Va. at 634, 32 S.E. at 295.
'2oi Va. 693, 697, 112 S.E.2d 911, 914 (19i6); Buchanan v. Wilson, 159 Va. 49,
59, 165 S.E. 422, 425 (1932); Royal Idem. Co. v. Hook, 155 Va. 956, 97o , 157 S.E. 414,
419 (1931); J. C. Lysle Milling Co. v. S. W. Holt & Co., 122 Va. 565, 571, 95 S.F. 414,
416 (1918).
OSome of the cases which have adopted this approach are: Corona Coal &
Iron Co. v. Callahan, 202 Ala. 649, 81 So. 591 (1919); Birmingham Mineral R. Co. v.
Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co., 127 Ala. 137, 28 So. 679, 681 (19oo); Syar v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 51 Cal. App. 2d 527, 125 P.-d 102, 1o4 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942);
Tsirlis v. Standard Oil, 32 Cal. App. 2d 469, 9 P.2d 128 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939); Pinnix
v. Griffin, 219 N.C. 35, 12 S.E.2d 667 (1941); Norton v. Harmon, 192 Okla. 36, 133
P.2d 206, 210 (1942); Stevens v. Moore, 211 S.C. 498, 46 S.E.2d 73, 77 (1948); Bass
v. American Products Export & Import Corp., 124 S.C. 346, 117 S.E. 594 (1923);
Bell v. Washam, 82 Ga. App. 63, 6o S.E.2d 4o8, 410 (95 o) (dictum).
Some courts recognize that this approach is more a lenient qualification, and
that by adopting it they are not strictly adhering to the rule that declarations by
the agent are inadmissible to prove agency. See, e.g., Cornora & Iron Co. v. Callahan,
2o2 Ala. 649, 81 So. 591, 592 (1919).
'1he following authorities support the majority rule. Edwards v. Rogers, 12o
F. Supp. 499, 503 (ED.S.C. 1954); Dennes v. Jefferson Meat Mkt., 228 Ky. 164, 14
S.V.2d 4o8 (1929); Dafoe v. Grantski, 143 Neb. 344, 9 N.V.2d 488 (1943); Annual
Survey of Virginia Law, 46 U. Va. L. Rev. 1481, 1516 (i96o); Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d
598, 6o6, 6og (1949); Comment, 16 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 47, 50 (1959).
It is well established, however, that the agent may testify at the trial concerning
his agency and the extent of his authority. Deitz v. Vhyte, 131 Va. 19, 26, log S.E.
212, 214 (1921). Of course, the agent's declarations are admissible against him in
a suit where he is a party. Mapes v. Foster, 38 Wyo. 244, 266 Pac. 1o9 (1928).
'Restatement (Second), Agency § 285 (1958). See cases cited in note 7 supra.
9For a collection of cases presenting the subject of declarations made by an
agent offered to prove course of employment as distinguished from the fact of
agency see Armot., 3 A-L.R.2d 598 (1949).
I'Dafoe v. Grantski, 143 Neb. 344, 9 N.V.2d 488, 491 (1943); Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d
598, 599 (1949); 2 Am. Jur. Agency § 445 (1936)-
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prove course of employment, it follows that the court has adopted
some reasoning to circumvent the limitations of the hearsay rule.
It is well established that the statements and admissions of an
agent are properly admissible in evidence against the principal if they
qualify as vicarious admissions." "Under the vicarious admissions
rule, a substantive rule of agency, an agent's out of court state-
ments as to his authority (or any other relevant matter) may be re-
ceived even though hearsay, if other evidence proves he was authorized
to speak."'12 The statements admitted in Turner were not vicarious ad-
missions because the authority to speak had not been established.13
But it does seem that the theory of vicarious admissions is an under-
lying factor in the adoption of this prima facie rule. It is apparently
reasoned in these cases that once the fact of agency is shown by some
evidence, then the agent may speak for his principal as to matters
which are authorized; and the fact that the agent declares that he
is in the course of his employment is assumed to have been author-
ized. Since the authority was never established in Turner, it appears
that in adopting the prima facie rule the court is creating a separate
rule of admissibility.
The rationale, however, for the admission of these hearsay dec-
larations in evidence is that they are admitted in corroboration of
other evidence of agency. 14 The underlying theory for all the excep-
tions to the hearsay rule is that there is a degree of reliability in the
very nature of the declaration sought to be admitted.15 It is indicated
that the presence of this corroborative element overcomes hearsay ob-
u4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1o78 (3d ed. 194o).
UMurphy Auto Parts Co. v. Ball, 249 F.2d 5o8, 51o (D.C. Cir. 1957).
"What is meant by establishing the fact of the authority? It is "the requirement
that the agency and the consequent authority to make the statement must be proved
by other evidence than the purported agent's own declarations." McCormick, Some
Evidence Questions in Personal Injury Cases Suggested by Recent Texas Decisions,
21 Texas L. Rev. 298, 3o7 (1943). "[I]t is, of course, not meant that there must first
be a separate verdict found establishing that fact; what is meant is, that there must
first be some competent testimony offered tending to prove that fact." i Mechem,
Agency § 285 n.81 (2d ed. 1914). However, if the evidence is admitted before the
fact of agency and authority to speak is established this error will be cured if those
facts are subsequently established. Ibid. Moreover, the trial judge within his dis-
cretion may alter the order of proof so that the declaration may be admitted upon
condition of subsequent proof of the authority. Ibid.
"Birmingham Mineral R. Co. v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co., 127 Ala. 137,
28 So. 679, 681 (0oo); Norton v. Harmon, 102 Okla. 36, 133 P.2d 206, 210 (1942);
Broadway v. Jeffers, 185 S.C. 523, 194 S.E. 642, 647 (1938); J. C. Lysle Milling Co.
v. S. W. Holt : Co., 122 Va. 565, 95 S.E. 414, 416 (1918); Bell v. Washam, 82 Ga.
App. 63, 6o S.E.2d 408 (1950) (dictum); Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 46 Va.
L. Rev. 1481, 1516 (196o).
USee 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1420 3d ed. 1940).
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jections on the theory that if the declarations corroborate other evi-
dence, they are likely to have a greater degree of reliability.16 It is
submitted, however, that the mere fact that .a hearsay declaration
corroborates other evidence of agency does not render it sufficiently
reliable to overcome hearsay objections. By definition, corroborative
evidence is evidence that tends in some degree to support an essential
allegation or issue.17 Of course, the agent's declaration that he was
acting in the course of his employment would lend support to the
issue of course of employment. But the question remains: is the dec-
laration more reliable merely because it adds to the cumulative
amount of evidence? It is submitted that it is not. The various ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule are based on the theory that some extra-
judicial declarations are reliable because of the surrounding circum-
stances at the time the declaration was made,' 8 and not at the time
that the declaration is offered in evidence. Therefore, the mere fact
that the hearsay declaration is corroborative of other evidence pre-
sented at the trial does not make it any more reliable than it would
be without such evidence.
The courts have applied the prima fade rule to both contract and
tort cases, but it appears that the rule originated in Virginia in the
contract cases and was later extended to the tort field.19 The contract
cases present the more usual principal-agent relationship whereby an
agent is authorized to bind his principal by contract. Even without
this rule, declarations made by an agent concerning his authority
"Murphy Auto Parts Co. v. Bali, 249 F.2d 5o8, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
"Davies v. Silvey, 148 Va. 132, 138, 138 S.E. 513, 515 (1927), citing Gildersleve
v. Atkinson, 6 N.M. 250, 27 Pac. 477 (1891).
See5 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1420, 1422 (3d ed. 1940).
"This is evident from the cases cited by the court in Turner: J. C. Lysle Milling
Co. v. S. W. Holt & Co., Royal Idem. Co. v. Hook, and Buchanan v. Wilson, supra
note 5. The first two cases involved situations wherein the principal contended that
the agent was acting outside his authority in dealng with the third party. The rule
later came to be applied in the tort field in Buchanan v. Wilson.
In Lysle Milling Co. the court stated: "Looking to the evidence as a whole, we
think there was direct testimony tending materially to show that his agency carried
with it the authority to make sales, and that, therefore... it was proper... to admit,
in corroboration, the declarations on that subject made by [the agent] ... in the
course of the exercise of his alleged agency." 122 Va. at 570 , 95 S.E. at 416 (1918). It
would appear, therefore, that the declarations sought to be admitted were properly
admissible in any event because there was a sufficient showing of the authority to
make the statements. i Mechem, op. cit. supra note 13 § 285.
' In the instant case and in Buchanan v. Wilson, supra, both tort cases, the au-
thority was never shown by testimonial evidence; all that existed was a presumption
of course of employment that arose from the proof of ownership and employment.
This would not appear to be a sufficient showing of authority within the language
of the court in the Lysle case.
VIRGINIA COMMENTS
might properly be received in evidence merely to show the reliance of
a third party in dealing with him as an agent.20 The declarations are
not within the hearsay rule because they are not offered to establish
the truth of the matter asserted therein.21
The typical application of the prima facie rule in the tort field is
seen in the instant case-an automobile accident wherein the agent
is alleged to have been acting within the scope of his employment at
the time of the accident. With respect to the employer, declarations
by the driver that he was employed by the defendant and that he
was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the ac-
cident are within the hearsay rule since they are being offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. Clearly, they cannot qualify as
vicarious admissions until the authority of the agent to speak is es-
tablished. But since the prima facie rule is itself a rule of admissi-
bility, the declarations become admissible. It is submitted that the
application of the rule to the automobile cases represents a question-
able extension from a dissimilar agency situation.22
Other theories have been employed to admit the declarations of
an agent to prove course of employment. 23 The one most frequently
relied upon is the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. 24 Res
gestae is often confused with the doctrines of vicarious admissions and
spontaneous utterances, thereby resulting in a tendency to blur the
requirements of the two latter exceptions.25 Under the res gestae ex-
'Ralston Purina Co. v. Novak, iii F.2d 631, 637 (8th Cir. 1940); Nowell v.
Chipman, 17o Mass. 340, 49 N.E. 631 (1898).
"Annot., 8o A.L.R. 603 (1932). In order for a declaration to be barred under the
hearsay rule it must be offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Morgan, Admis-
sions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 3o Yale L. J. 355 (1921); 6 Wigmore,
Evidence § 1766 (3d ed. 194o).
'See note 19 supra.
This relates to declarations that are properly admissible under the general
rules of evidence. Such declarations are admissible regardless of whether the de-
clarant is an agent. Restatement (Second), Agency § 289 (1958). See note, 43 Harv.
L. Rev. 936 (193o); Note, 37 Ky. L.J. 417 (1949).2'Lowie v. Dixie Stores Inc., 172 S.C. 468, 174 S.E. 394 (1934); 6 Wigmore, Evi-
dence § 1769 (3d ed. 1940); Comment, 36 Ky. L.J. 471 (1948). See cases cited in
3 A.L.R.2d 598, 607, 6o9 (1949).
Contra, Meyers v. McMaken, 133 Neb. 524, 276 N.W. 167 (1937). The court
rejected the rule to the effect that if the declarations are part of the res gestae
they may be used to prove agency. "We think that these decisions constitute a min-
ority view and that the better rule is that statements of an alleged agent concerning
the existence or extent of his authority are not admissible against the principal to
prove its existence or extent even though they might properly be designated as a
part of the res gestae." Id. at 168.
-Murphy Auto Parts Co. v. Ball, 249 F.2d 5o8, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Chantry
v. Pettit Motor Co., 156 S.C. 1, 152 S.E. 753, 76o (1930) (dissenting opinion); 6 Wig-
i96i]
156 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVIII
ception, declarations of an agent which constitute a part of the trans-
action and are calculated to explain the transaction in issue are ad-
missible in evidence.2 6 It has been suggested that the use of the term
res gestae is "merely an obscure way of saying that the statement must
be made as part of the performance of an authorized act."27 Therefore,
the declaration may qualify as a vicarious admission.
Another approach to this general problem is the spontaneous
utterance exception to the hearsay rule.28 In Murphy Auto Parts Co. v.
Ball 29 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a
declaration by the agent after a collision that " he had to call on a
customer and was in a bit of a hurry to get home"30 was admissible in
evidence as a spontaneous utterance to prove course of employment.
The court stated that "the rationale of the excited utterance doctrine
furnishes a separate and distinct basis for admissibility, not to be
confused with the vicarious admissions rule."31 Even though the
declaration was made by an agent and it had not been proven that
the agent was acting in the course of his employment, the declaration
was admissible against the principal. The fact that the declarant is
an agent is immaterial insofar as the admissibility of the spontaneous
utterance is concerned because such a declaration is admissible any-
way under general rules of evidence.
32
The state of mind exception to the hearsay rule has also been
employed to admit declarations of* an agent to prove course of em-
ployment.3 3 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Garford
Trucking Corp. v. Nann34 admitted into evidence the extra-judicial
statements of a truckdriver concerning his reasons for deviating from
his instructed route. The court stated that a declaration "introduced
in order to show the purpose for which he did an act or to show his
more, Evidence § 1768 (3d ed. 194o); Comment, 4 Texas L. Rev. 5o6 (1926). See
Catterall, Res Gestae in Virginia, 21 Va. L. Rev. 725 (1935).
wHackney v. Dudley, 216 Ala. 4oo, 113 So. 401, 403 (1927). Salmon v. Pearce,
223 N.C. 587, 27 S.E.2d 647 (1943); Chantry v. Pettit Motor Co., 156 S.C. 1, 152 S.E.
753. 761-62 (193o)) (dissenting opinion). See 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1769 (3d ed.
194o), quoting Professor James Bradley Thayer.
2Comment, 4 Texas L. Rev. 506, 508 (1926).
2Salmon v. Pearce, 223 N.C. 587, 27 S.E.2d 647 (1943); Restatement (Second),
Agency § 289 comment d (1958). For an explanation of this exception to the hearsay
rule see 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1745 et seq. (3d ed. 194o).
2'249 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
301d. at 5oG9.
asld. at 51o.
82Id. at 5si; Restatement (Second), Agency § 289 (1958).
3lMattan v. Hoover Co., 350 Mo. 506, 166 S.W.2d 557, 566-67 (1942); Restatement
(Second), Agency § 289 comment c (1958). For an explanation of this exception to
the hearsay rule see 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1725 et seq. (3d ed. 1946).
"163 F.2d 71 (ist Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 81o (1947).
